They have worked with my teams on a wide range of corporate and commercial negotiations for almost 20 years. Rather than play the game that presents itself, they proactively set up a negotiation game that has a higher probability of achieving a successful outcome. Jim Sebenius. His 3-D approach is in use at many levels of the Estee Lauder Companies with excellent results. The two years prior to their engagement were filled with public sparring, litigation, and unproductive negotiation.
They helped me think carefully about my own interests, worked to create leverage with respect to the buyer and developed a plan to meet the fundamental interests of both buyer and seller. They negotiated on my behalf with their chosen intermediary, the distinguished Baron David de Rothschild, and achieved an agreement that met my interests so well that it surpassed my expectations at the time I engaged them of what might be achievable in the negotiation.
For example, the owners of a niche packaging company that boasted an innovative technology and a novel product were deep in price negotiation to sell the company to one of three potential industry buyers, all larger packaging operations.
Build powerful negotiation skills and become a better dealmaker and leader. In doing so, they uncovered a completely new source of potential value value creation — and a much higher potential selling price. They also increased pressure on the larger packaging companies to up their offers, because they would lose all competitive position if the deal went through. At the outset of the sale process, the niche player negotiated, however skillfully, at the wrong table.
The third, however, may be less familiar. Instead, tial to promoting agreement among the par- Microsoft shifted the negotiations from ties. Rather than focus on selling rael large amounts of military and financial to the technologists, Microsoft concentrated aid; and Israel supplied Egypt with territory. Instead Microsoft changed the game toward a more of mainly working with its bankers to make compatible counterpart Y, emphasizing issues the case for a higher valuation and to refine its C, D, and E, on which it was strong.
Its broader analysis suggested that one sonal approach to negotiation. The move un- enhancing the underlying setup of the negotia- covered a completely new source of potential tion itself. By adding complementary price. It also increased the pressure on the parties or issues to the negotiating process, 3- larger packaging companies: They would face D negotiators can not only claim value for more competition and might not be able offer themselves but also create more value for all the same kind of exclusive, customized packag- parties involved.
In Co-opetition, their influen- ing service to their customers. All company names and details have been disguised. After the basic deal was done, they needed additional financing to make profitable improvements at CPP.
Federal Street Bank FSB turned them down flat, even after they had used such 1-D tactics as persuasive appeals and elegant lunches. It was time to move into the 3-D realm. But first, some background. So Iverson used 3-D negotiating tactics to scan widely and map backward from his current predicament to establish the prior agreements with as-yet uninvolved parties that would maxi- mize the chances of an ultimate yes from the bank.
Involve UIC. He argued that con- ture; Worldwide Insurance had higher cord. The council received For a commitment fee plus a share of in- would build. The rest of the required these arguments favorably but, before creased profits from the boiler, Unified system would be complex. Local and committing, wanted assurances that agreed to lend, conditional on the suc- regional contractors were in no posi- the project would actually work.
Involve Derano. In great need without guaranteed takeout financing of some plausible guarantee of project 2. Involve the EDA. Derano expressed serious doubts opment Administration EDA could matching funds from the LDA and a about managing an already-designed make junior subordinated loans to guarantee of a successful, certified, project with BFE and local contractors firms for certified job-creating job-creating project.
And there was no in place. But by offering to pay above projects; the overall loan limit was LDA to certify the jobs or provide the normal fee, Iverson got Derano to equal to the number of jobs times matching funds. Involve the Town of Concord.
Go back to Concord with Der- and its formal job certification along modification. Returning to the bank, ano deal. Go back to UIC to modify its nent financing. And the project was launched. For example, a U. From membership contri- questions that focus on relative valuation. What out- converting the dollars to local currency at the side issues might be highly valued if they were official exchange rate to buy development incorporated into the process? Are there any rights.
Read Online Download. Lax Original Title: 3-D Negotiation Book Format: ebook Number Of Pages: pages First Published in: August 1st Latest Edition: August 20th category: business, non fiction, self help, language, communication, buisness, business, management, psychology, textbooks, economics, self help, personal development Formats: ePUB Android , audible mp3, audiobook and kindle.
Great book, 3-D Negotiation pdf is enough to raise the goose bumps alone. Add a review Your Rating: Your Comment:. One that meets ego needs as well as economic ones?
Beyond the interpersonal and deal design challenges executives face in 1-D and 2-D negotiations lie the 3-D obstacles—flaws in the negotiating setup itself. Common problems in this often-neglected third dimension include negotiating with the wrong parties or about the wrong set of issues, involving parties in the wrong sequence or at the wrong time, as well as incompatible or unattractive no-deal options.
Acting entrepreneurially, away from the table, they ensure that the right parties are approached in the right order to deal with the right issues, by the right means, at the right time, under the right set of expectations, and facing the right no-deal options.
Former U. Many people mistake tactics for the underlying substance and the relentless efforts away from the table that are needed to set up the most promising possible situation once you face your counterpart. When you know what you need and you have put a broader strategy in place, then negotiating tactics will flow. Even managers who possess superior interpersonal skills in negotiations can fail when the barriers to agreement fall in the 3-D realm. Chile had what appeared to be a very attractive walkaway option—or in negotiation lingo, a BATNA best alternative to negotiated agreement.
By unilateral action, the Chilean government could radically change the financial terms of the deal or even expropriate the mine. Imagine that Kennecott had adopted a 1-D strategy focusing primarily on interpersonal actions at the bargaining table.
It would try to be culturally sensitive, and it might choose elegant restaurants in which to meet. Fortunately for Kennecott, its negotiators adopted a 3-D strategy and set up the impending talks most favorably. The team took six steps and changed the playing field altogether.
Second, to sweeten that offer, the company proposed using the proceeds from the sale of equity, along with money from an Export-Import Bank loan, to finance a large expansion of the mine. Third, it induced the Chilean government to guarantee this loan and make the guarantee subject to New York state law. Fourth, Kennecott insured as much as possible of its assets under a U. And sixth, the collection rights to these contracts were sold to a consortium of European, U. These actions fundamentally changed the negotiations.
Instead of facing the original negotiation with Kennecott alone, Chile now effectively faced a multiparty negotiation with players who would have future dealings with that country—not only in the mining sector but also in the financial, industrial, legal, and public sectors. If an agreement were not reached and Chile acted to expropriate the operation, Kennecott would have a host of parties on its side. It is unlikely that 1-D tactical or interpersonal brilliance at the table—whether in the form of steely gazes, culturally sensitive remarks, or careful and considered listening to all parties—could have saved Kennecott from its fundamentally adverse bargaining position.
Successful 3-D negotiators induce target players to say yes by improving the proposed deal, enhancing their own BATNAs, and worsening those of the other parties. It drives you nuts, trying to juggle them all. But number one, it will change the perception on the other side of the table. And number two, it will change your self-perception.
It will come across with a whole other level of conviction. While negotiators should generally try to improve their BATNAs, they should also be aware that some of the moves they make might inadvertently worsen their walkaway options. For instance, several years ago, we worked with a U. The company had already researched possible cultural barriers and ranked its three potential partners according to the competencies it found most desirable in those companies. After approaching the negotiations in a culturally sensitive spirit, and in what had seemed a very logical sequence, the U.
The team abandoned those talks and was now deep into the process with the second most desirable candidate—and again, things were going badly. Imagine subsequent negotiations with the third, barely acceptable, partner if the second set of talks had also foundered—in an industry where all would quickly know the results of earlier negotiations.
As each set of negotiations failed, the U. Fortunately, the U. This helped the U. The U. In short, doing so would have created the equivalent of a simultaneous four-party negotiation structured as one U. This more promising 3-D setup would have greatly enhanced whatever 1-D cultural insight and tactical ingenuity the U. Swiss banking executives saw no reason to be forthcoming with Bronfman; they believed they were on strong legal ground because the restitution issue had been settled years ago.
But after eight months of lobbying by Bronfman, the World Jewish Congress, and others, the negotiations were dramatically expanded—to the detriment of the Swiss. The bankers faced a de facto coalition of interests that credibly threatened the lucrative Swiss share of the public finance business in states such as California and New York.
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